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DISABILITY LAW-Needless Institutionalization of
Individuals with Mental Disabilities as Discrimination
Under the ADA-Olmstead v. L.C.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Olmstead v. LC.,' the United States Supreme Court held that Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)2 may require the placement of
persons with mental disabilities in community settings, rather than in institutions,
when: (1) the state's treatment professionals determine that such a placement is
appropriate, (2) the transfer is not opposed by the individual, and (3) the placement
can be reasonably accommodated given the resources available to the state and its
obligation to provide for the needs of others with mental disabilities.' The majority
holding, which garnered the support of five Justices,4 stated that a failure to provide
care for individuals with mental disabilities in the most integrated setting
appropriate to their needs may be viewed as discrimination, in violation of the
ADA, unless the state or other public entity can demonstrate an inability to provide
less restrictive care without "fundamentally altering" the nature of its programs.5
The Olmstead Court's construction of the ADA's Title II anti-discrimination
provision,6 and its application of the Attorney General's Title HI integration
regulations,' should encourage states to hasten efforts to eliminate unjustified
segregation of individuals with mental disabilities by transferring funding to
community care programs and taking steps to move unnecessarily institutionalized
patients into more integrated community settings. It appears, however, that any
positive impact on the rights of people with mental disabilities has been diluted by
the Court's failure to provide meaningful parameters for the defense that states may
raise to excuse a lack of adequate community placements. Although the Olmstead
decision speaks to a greater recognition of the rights of those with mental
disabilities,8 it leaves a number of important questions unanswered and may not
offer the guidance necessary to effectively decrease unjustified institutional
segregation without further controversy.
This Note begins by proceeding through the facts and procedural history of the
Olmstead decision. Next, it provides an historical and contextual background
section. A brief overview of the Olmstead decision is followed by a more detailed
examination of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Finally, this Note
analyzes the Court's decision and discusses its implications for the rights of
individuals with mental disabilities to minimally restrictive care and greater
community participation.

1. 119 S. Ct. 2176(1999).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
3. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181.
4. See id. Justice Ginsburg delivered the majority opinionjoined by Justices O'Connor, Souter and Breyer,
and by Justice Stevens on most portions of the opinion. See id.
5. See id. at 2183; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7), (d) (1999).
6. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181-82, 2186 (construing42 U.S.C. § 12132).
7. See id. at 2182-83, 2186 (construing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130).

8. See id. at 2185-88 (holding that unjustified institutional segregation is to be properly regarded as
discrimination based on disability).
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f1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Olmstead controversy arose when an action for declaratory and injunctive
relief was brought on behalf of two individuals with mental disabilities in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia." Plaintiffs, who
had been institutionalized in a state mental hospital, alleged that under Title II of the
ADA and the Fourteenth Amendment they were entitled to an order requiring the
state to provide them care in a community-based treatment program, rather than a
state mental hospital." Plaintiffs, both of whom were deemed appropriate for
transfer to a less restrictive community-based program, contended that they had
been unnecessarily segregated in an institutional setting, and that the State's failure
to transfer them to a community program constituted unlawful discrimination on the
basis of their disabilities, in violation of the ADA." Plaintiffs also alleged that
defendants' had failed to provide them "minimally adequate treatment and
habilitation and freedom from undue restraint" in violation of their rights under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
Plaintiffs L.C. and E.W. are women with developmental disabilities.' 4 L.C. has
also been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and E.W. with a personality disorder.'
In May 1992, L.C. was voluntarily admitted to Georgia Regional Hospital (GRH)
6
in Atlanta and confined for treatment in a psychiatric unit.' Her psychiatric
condition had stabilized by May 1993, and her treatment team agreed that her needs
could be met in a state-supported, community-based program. 7 In May 1995, while
still confined in GRH, L.C. filed suit, requesting that the State place her in a
community-based residential program that could provide her with habilitative
8
treatment intended to maximize her integration into the mainstream of society.
L.C. remained institutionalized until February of 1996.' 9
E.W. was voluntarily admitted to GRH in February 1995 and was, like L.C.,
confined for treatment in a psychiatric unit.' In March 1995, GRH made efforts
toward discharging E.W. to a homeless shelter, but this inappropriate discharge plan
9. See L.C. v. Olnstead, No. l:95-cv-1210-MHS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3540, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 25,

1997).
10. See id.
11. See id. at *6; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) (The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990). Title
Uof the ADA, the public services portion, states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." Id.
12. The Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Human Resources, the Superintendent of Georgia
Regional Hospital in Atlanta, and the Executive Director of the Fulton County Regional Board were named as
defendants, and are referred to collectively as the State. See LC. v. Olmstead, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3540, at *2-3.
13. See id. at *6.
14. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2183; see also TiEAMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 39-42,65-77 (4th ed. 1994) (providing diagnostic criteria for
mental retardation and for other pervasive developmental disorders).
15. See Olmstead, 119 S.Ct. at 2183; see also DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, supra note 14, at 285-286, 633 (providing diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia and personality
disorder).
16. See O/rstead, 119 S.Ct. at 2183.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 2183.84.
19. See id. at 2183.

20. See id.
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was abandoned after her attorney filed an administrative complaint.2" By 1996,
E.W. was deemed ready for transfer to a community-based setting but remained
institutionalized at GRH until after the District Court issued its judgment in231997.22
E.W. intervened in the action initiated by L.C., stating an identical claim.

In 1997, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs
and held that the State's failure to place plaintiffs in an appropriate communitybased treatment program constituted discrimination by reason of disability in
violation of Title II of the ADA and its accompanying regulations promulgated by
the Attorney General. 24 Although the State had argued that inadequate funding,
rather than discrimination, accounted for plaintiffs' continued institutionalization,
the court rejected this argument. 25 "The fact that it may be more convenient, either
administratively or fiscally, to provide services in a segregated manner does not
justify defendants' failure to comply with the ADA."' The court rejected the
State's argument that immediate transfers in cases of this kind would "fundamentally alter" the State's activity. 27 Plaintiffs' constitutional claims were not reached
by the court but were determined to have been rendered moot by the court's grant
of summary judgment on plaintiffs' ADA claim.2" The court ordered that plaintiffs
be placed in a community-based program and provided with services necessary to
maintain their placement in the community.29
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment that the State had discriminated against plaintiffs by unnecessarily
confining them in a segregated environment, but remanded the case for reassessment of the State's cost-based fundamental alteration defense.3" The Eleventh
Circuit held that the ADA imposes a duty to provide treatment in the most
integrated setting appropriate to an individual's needs.3 This duty, however, is not
absolute according to the Eleventh Circuit, which stated that the Attorney General's
Title II regulations require a state to make "reasonable modifications" without
demanding "fundamental alterations. 3 2 The district court was instructed to
consider, on remand, whether the additional cost of treating L.C. and E.W. in a
community-based program would be unreasonable or would require "fundamental
21.

See id.

22. See id.
23. Seeid. at2184.
24. See LC. v. Olmstead, No. l:95-cv-1210-MHS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3540, at *6-10; see also 28

C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1999) (stating that a "public entity shall administer services.., in the most integrated setting
appropriateto the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities"); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (7) (1999) (stating that
a "public entity shall make reasonable modifications . . .necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability," unless doing so would "fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity").
25. See Omtead, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3540, at *9.
26. Id. at* 12.
27. See id. at *11-12 (finding that discrimination cannot be excused by a lack of funding, and that
defendants had existing programs providing community services to individuals with mental disabilities).
28. See id. at *13-14 (holding that because the court had already determined that plaintiffs' continued
institutionalization was unlawfully discriminatory under the ADA, the declaratory and injunctive relief requested
by plaintiffs had already been granted, making it unnecessary for the court to address plaintiffs' constitutional
claim).
29. See id. at *14.
30. See L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 895, 905 (11th Cir. 1998).

31. See id. at 902; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1999).
32. See Omstead, 138 F.3d at 904; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (7) (1999).
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alterations" in the nature of services the State provides. 3' The district court was also
instructed to consider the demands of the State's mental health budget in making
this determination.34
After certiorari had been granted, and while the case was pending before the
Supreme Court, the district court, on remand from the Eleventh Circuit, compared
the cost of providing community-based care to plaintiffs with the State's overall
mental health budget and rejected the State's argument that the continuation of
35
plaintiffs' institutionalization was justified by budget constraints. The
36 court
plaintiffs.
beyond
decision
its
of
impact
potential
the
irrelevant
declared
Although plaintiffs were receiving community-based care at the time of the
the controversy
Supreme Court decision, the case was not considered moot because
,37
at hand would be "capable of repetition, yet evading review.
Twenty-two states and the Territory of Guam joined a brief, in support of
3
petitioner-defendants, urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. ' However,
upon further reflection, many of these states withdrew from the group opposing the
Eleventh Circuit's ruling. Thirteen states filed a brief on the merits in support of
petitioners, but several of those states wrote the Court in order to withdraw from the
brief before the case was heard.39
In June of 1999, the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in part,
vacated it in part, and remanded it for further proceedings.'

M. BACKGROUND
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was intended to "provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against

33. See Olmstead, 138 F.3d at 905; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (7).
34. See supra note 33.
35. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185 n.7.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 2184 n.6 (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-323 (1988)).
38. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the States of Florida, etal. in Support of Petitioners for a Writ of Certiorari
at 2-8, Olmstead v. L.C. 119 S.Ct. 2176 (1999) (No. 98-536) (arguing that the petition for a writ of certiorari
presented important questions of federal law, which could impact the states' delivery of services to individuals with
disabilities); Olmstead, 119 S.Ct. at 2185 n.8; see also Olmstead v. L.C. 525 U.S. 1054 (1998), cert. granted,
amended by, 525 U.S. 1062 (1998) (clarifying, three days after the grant of certiorari, that certiorari was granted

only in regards to the first of the two questions presented by petitioners; the Court granted certiorari on the issue
of whether the ADA requires states to provide treatment in a minimally restrictive environment, but did not grant
certiorari on the issue of the ADA's constitutionality); Olmstead, 119 S.Ct. at 2181 (stating that the case presents
"no constitutional question" because the lower courts had not reached plaintiffs' constitutional claims, but had
"resolved the case solely on statutory grounds").
39. Only seven remaining states supported petitioners on the merits. The majority of states which had urged
the Court to grant certiorari had withdrawn their support of petitioners, including the State of Florida which had
sponsored the Amicus Brief urging the Court to grant certiorari. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185 n.8; Amicus
Curiae Brief of the States in Support of Petitioners, Olmstead, (No. 98-536); Amicus Curiae Brief of the States of
in Support of Petitioners for a Writ of Certiorari Olmstead (No. 98-536); Bazelon Centerfor Mental
Florida, et al.

Health Law (last modified 02-07-00) <http:llwww.bazelon.org>.
40. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185, 2190 (affirming that unnecessary institutional segregation qualifies
as discrimination by reason of disability, but vacating the Eleventh Circuit's remand instruction as unduly
restrictive in regard to the fundamental alteration defense available to the states); see also L.C. v. Olmstead, 198
F.3d 1259 (11 th Cir. 1999) (ordering, upon remand from the Supreme Court, that the case be remanded to the
district court to be decided in conformity with the Court's decision).
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individuals with disabilities."' Congress stated in the opening provisions of the

ADA that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem[.]" 4'2 The Congressional Findings portion of the ADA names institutionalization
as one of the "critical areas" where "discrimination against individuals with
disabilities persists,"'43 although Title II of the ADA, the public services section,
does not specifically mention institutionalization as a form of discrimination." The
ADA is the federal government's most recent and most extensive effort to address
discrimination against those with disabilities.4 5 Prior to the enactment of the ADA,
Congress had addressed the civil rights of individuals with disabilities through the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973' and the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act of 1975."7
Congress, in the ADA, instructed the Attorney General to issue regulations
implementing the Title II provisions." The "integration regulation," which requires
a public entity to administer its programs in "the most integrated setting appropriate
to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities,"4' 9 and the "reasonablemodifications regulation," which requires public entities to make "reasonable
modifications," but not to "fundamentally alter" the nature of their programs, 5° were
promulgated by the Attorney General to implement the ADA's Title II provisions.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)(1994).
42. Id. (a)(2); see Brief for Respondents at v-1, Olmstead (No. 98-536) (discussing the history of
institutionalization of persons with mental disabilities). Although some individuals may periodically require a
hospital setting, the movement beginning around the turn of the century to institutionalize a large portion of persons
with mental disabilities in "jail-like asylums" was largely a product of Social Darwinism, the eugenics movement,
and the desire of society to "not have [those with mental disabilities] in [its] midst." Id. In the past three decades,
societal attitudes have begun to change, resulting in a national shift toward community-based care for individuals
with mental disabilities, such as group homes. See id. at 1-3. See generally THE STATE OF THE STATES IN
DEVELOPMENTAL DIsABILrTnEs (David Braddock et al. eds., 5th ed. 1998) (providing an historical perspective on
society's treatment of individuals with developmental disabilities, as well as the summary of a state-by-state study
evaluating the provision of services to individuals with developmental disabilities).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (3) (1994).
44. See id. § 12132 (stating that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by such an entity").
45. See Olmstead, 119 S.Ct. at 2181 n.1; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
46. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181 n.l. (referring to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et
seq. (1976)).
47. See id. (referring to the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 6001
et seq. (1976)).
48. See id. at 2182-83 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a)-(b) (1994) as instructing that these regulations were
to be consistent with the coordination regulations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); see also 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d)
(1999). One of the § 504 regulations requires services to be delivered in "the most integrated setting appropriate
to the needs of" qualified individuals. See id
49. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1999); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 37-4-121 (1999) (expressing preference for
minimally restrictive placement); Brief for Petitioners at 6-7, Olmstead (No. 98-536) (asserting that Georgia has
been following national trend by providing more community placements and decreasing the number of hospitalized
patients). But see Brief for Respondents at 4 Olmstead (No. 98-536) (asserting that, at the time suit was filed,
Georgia ranked 48th among the states in funding services in the community for individuals with mental
disabilities). See generallyTHE STATE OFTHE STATES INDEVELOPMENTALDtSAILrrEms, supra note 42, at 173-80
(detailing trends in the State of Georgia in public spending for the care of individuals with developmental
disabilities).
50. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (7) (1999).
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The Supreme Court, prior to Olmstead, has had some occasion to address
to receive care in the least
whether individuals with mental disabilities are entitled
52
5
restrictive environment appropriate to their needs. ' In Pennhurstv. Halderman
(hereafter "Pennhurst l"), the Court held that the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DD Act)53 did not create any "substantive rights"
to treatment in the "least restrictive environment" for individuals with developmental disabilities.s' Although the DD Act does show a congressional.preference for
minimally restrictive care, 5 the majority in PennhurstI held that, since the DD Act
was enacted pursuant to congressional spending power, rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment, the language regarding least restrictive care was merely "precatory"
and did not create affirmative legal duties in the states.' Upon remand, the court of
appeals affirmed its previous decision, based upon Pennsylvania statutory and7 case
law, to grant injunctive relief to plaintiff patients of Pennhurst Hospital. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari once again and, in PennhurstII, overruled the
court of appeals' decision. 8 The Court held that a federal court lacks jurisdiction
over a suit for injunctive relief against state officials based on state law because
such an action contravenes the Eleventh Amendment.59
A year after PennhurstI,' in the related case of Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court

held that an involuntarily committed patient diagnosed with mental retardation had
due process liberty interests that "require[d] the State to provide minimally
adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint[.]" 6 ' The Youngberg decision was the Supreme Court's first ruling on the
substantive constitutional rights of involuntarily institutionalized individuals with
mental disabilities.62 Even though this decision did represent an increased
recognition of the rights of individuals with mental disabilities, the Court did not
directly address the rights of patients to habilitation training or the rights of those
51. See, e.g., Pennhurst v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
52. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
53. See id. at 5 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976) (repealed 1984)).

54. See id at 18. A patient of Pennhurst hospital filed a class action suit, on behalf of herself and all other
residents of the hospital, alleging inhumane and dangerous conditions, unduly restrictive treatment, and a lack of
habilitative training. See id. at 6.
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976) (repealed 1984) (stating that "[t]he treatment, services, and habilitation
for a person with developmental disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the
person and should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty.").
56. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 5,17, 18; see also Reply Brief at 9, Olmstead (No. 98-536) (arguing that
Pennhurst should be followed). But see Brief for Respondents at 43-45, Olmstead (No. 98-536) (distinguishing
Pennhurst from the matter at hand).
57. See Pennhurst v. Halderman, 673 F.2d 647, 660-61 (3rd Cir. 1982) (affirming its previous holding,

despite Supreme Court decision that Developmentally Disabled Assistance Act did not create affirmative legal
duties, by relying on Pennsylvania statute and recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision regarding least
restrictive care); In re Schmidt, 429 A.2d 631,637 (Pa. 1981).
58. See Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 125 (1984).
59. See id. at 121.
60. See Pennhurst v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).

61. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,319 (1982). The conditions atPennhurst Hospital were addressed
once again, this time by an individual plaintiff rather than as a class action. See id.
62. See James W. Ellis, The Supreme Court and Institutions: A Comment on Youngberg v. Romeo, 20

MENTAL RETARDATION 197 (1982) (asserting that the Youngberg decision was important because of its
announcement of the protections which the U.S. Constitution affords to institutionalized individuals with mental
disabilities).
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who had not been involuntarily committed. 63 Olmstead is the first Supreme Court
decision to address whether states must, under the ADA, provide community-based
treatment to individuals with mental disabilities who are deemed appropriate for a
setting less restrictive than institutionalization."
Although Olmsteadis the only Supreme Court case that has addressed the rights
of patients with mental disabilities to receive minimally restrictive care under the
ADA, other recent Supreme Court cases have appeared to narrow the applicability
of the ADA in other contexts.' In Murphy v. U.P.S.," the Court held that the
determination of whether a condition qualifies as a disability under the ADA is to
be made with reference to the mitigating measures available to the individual.67 In
Murphy, a mechanic who was fired from his job because of high blood pressure had
no ADA claim against his employer because his condition was controllable by
medication and, accordingly, did not qualify as a disability.6 Similarly, in Sutton
v. United Airlines," two pilots who were not hired because of their visual
impairments had no claim under the ADA because their visual impairments could
be remedied by the use of corrective lenses. ° Both of these recent decisions appear
to narrow the applicability of the ADA by strictly construing what constitutes a
disability and consequently limiting what can be deemed discrimination." Against
this backdrop and the Court's apparent reluctance to broaden the ADA's applicability in these recent cases, the Olmstead decision is notable for the majority's
willingness to resist a narrow construction of discrimination under the ADA.72
WY.RATIONALE
A. Overview
Although the Supreme Court appeared divided in regard to a number of issues,
six Justices joined in the judgment and held that the Eleventh Circuit's decision was
to be affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. "3 Justice Ginsburg delivered
the Court's decision, joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, and by Justice
Stevens on most portions of the majority opinion.74 The Court held that Title Hof

63. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 318; Ellis, supra note 62, at 198, 200. Because plaintiff in Youngberg was
involuntarily committed and had severe mental disabilities, which all parties had conceded would disallow him
from being able to move into the community, the Court did not have before it the question of the appropriate
habilitation for individuals who, with sufficient training, could live outside an institution. See id.
64. See OInstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2176.
65. See, e.g., Murphy v. U.P.S., 119 S. CL 2133,2138 (1999); Sutton v. United Airlines, 119 S. Ct. 2139,
2152 (1999).
66. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
67. See id. at 2137.
68. See id
69. 119 S. CL 2139 (1999).
70. See id at 2143.
71. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143.
72. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2186.

73. Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, and Kennedy joined in the judgment. See
Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181.
74. See id. at 2181-89. Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer joined in the entirety of Justice Ginsburg's

opinion. Justice Stevens, who also wrote a concurrence, joined the majority opinion on portions 1,11, and IMA, but
did not join the portion of the opinion, 10, concerning the Eleventh Circuit's construction of the reasonable
modifications regulation. See id
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the ADA may require the placement of persons with mental disabilities in
community settings rather than in institutions when: 1) the State's treatment
professionals determine that such a placement is appropriate, 2) when the transfer
is not opposed by the individual, and 3) when the placement can be reasonably
accommodated given the resources available to the State and the needs of others
with mental disabilities.75
Justices Stevens and Kennedy wrote divergent concurring opinions.76 Justice
Stevens, who joined the majority opinion on most points," stated in his concurrence
that he would have affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision, indicating that the
error was with the district court's interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit's remand
instructions.78 Justice Stevens stated that the district court erred by concluding that
costs unrelated to plaintiffs' care should not be considered, 79 but did join the
majority in the judgment.'
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, also wrote a separate opinion,
which was joined in part by Justice Breyer.8 ' Justice Kennedy expressed concern
that the ADA could be interpreted by states in such a manner as to result in the
inappropriate deinstitutionalization of individuals requiring a structured environment.82 He cautioned that the opinions of treating physicians must be given the
greatest deference in order to avoid the inappropriate discharge of individuals with
mental disabilities into settings devoid of needed services.83 Justice Kennedy also
questioned the majority's definition of discrimination and argued for the need for
a comparison class in order to show the existence of discrimination. 4 Justice
Kennedy's concurrence also mentioned "federalism costs" and indicated that the
states must have wide discretion without undue interference from the federal
government in decisions regarding budget allocation and program development.8 5
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justice Scalia, wrote
a dissenting opinion. 6 The dissent questioned the majority's construction of the
ADA, its deference to the Attorney General's regulations, and its "remarkable and
novel"8 7 finding of discrimination in the absence of a comparison class.8 8 The

75. See id. at2181.
76. See id. at 2190-94 (although both concurring in the judgment of the majority, the opinions written by
Justices Stevens and Kennedy differ significantly, as discussed below).
77. See id. at 2181-89. Justice Stevens did not join the portion of the opinion concerning the Eleventh

Circuit's construction of the reasonable modifications regulation. See id.
78. See id. at 2190.
79. See id (articulating Justice Stevens' view that the error should be corrected either by the Court of
Appeals or by the Supreme Court in review of a decision by the Court of Appeals).
80. See id.
81. Justice Breyer, who also joined the majority opinion, joined Justice Kennedy on Part I of his

concurrence, regarding the danger of inappropriate deinstitutionalization, and the need to give deference to the
opinions of treating physicians. Justice Breyer did not join the portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion that addressed
the need for a comparison class to make a finding of discrimination. See id. at 2190-94.
82. See id. at 2191-92.
at2191.
83. See id.
part of his concurrence.See id. at 2193-94.
84. Justice Breyer did not join Justice Kennedy on this
85. See id.

86. See id. at 2194-99.
87. Id. at 2198.
88. See id. at 2195.
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9
dissent also criticized the tajority for the "imposition of a standard of care" and
'
stated that the majority's approach raises "significant federalism costs" by
directing how states are to make decisions about the delivery of public services.

The Majority Opinion
Because the lower courts had resolved the case on statutory grounds, certiorari
91
was granted in this case only as to the proper construction of the ADA. Therefore,
the Court did not address potential constitutional issues but concerned itself
primarily with determining the proper construction of the anti-discrimination
92
provisions contained in Title U (the public services portion) of the ADA.
The Court examined the opening provisions of the ADA, where Congress
discussed the fact that society has historically tended to "isolate and segregate"
93
individuals with disabilities-a practice described as a form of discrimination. The
critical
opening portions of the ADA also mention institutionalization as one of the
94
areas where discrimination against disabled persons exists.
The Court also examined the regulations that Congress instructed the Attorney
General to issue for the implementation of Title 10' One of these regulations,
known as the "integration regulation," requires public entities to "administer
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities." Another of the Attorney
General's Title II regulations requires public entities to make "reasonable
modifications" in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are
necessary to avoid discrimination based on disability, "unless the public entity can
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
the service, program or activity.'"
Although the Court declined to determine whether the Attorney General's
regulations would warrant the high degree of deference generally accorded to an
9
administrative regulation under Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council,"
it determined that the well-reasoned views of agencies implementing a statute
B.

89. Id. at 2198.

90. Id.
91. The lower courts had not addressed the Fourteenth Amendment claim initially raised by plaintiffs, but
granted relief solely on statutory grounds. See id at 2181; see also Olmstead v. L.C., 525 U.S. 1054 (1998), cert.

granted,amended by, 525 U.S. 1062 (1998) (granting certiorari only in regards to first question presented by

petitioner-defendants, regarding construction and application of the ADA; certiorari denied in regards to questions
concerning the ADA's constitutionality).
92. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181-83; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132 Q1994) (stating that "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity").
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2) (1994); Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (3).
95. See id. § 12134(a); Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2182-83.

96. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1999).
97. Id. §35.130(b) (7).
98. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (holding that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive

department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer).
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"constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance."'
The U.S. Department of Justice, argued the majority, has consistently held that
the unnecessary segregation of individuals with disabilities is a form of discrimination. 0 The majority rejected Petitioners' argument that L.C. and E.W. encountered
no discrimination because they failed to demonstrate that they were denied
community placements "by reason of" their disabilities and could identify no
comparison class.'' The Court asserted the belief that "Congress had a more
comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination as advanced in the ADA." 0 2
The Court reasoned that recognizing unjustified institutional isolation as a form of
discrimination reflects the judgment that institutionalization is "stigmatizing"" 3and
"severely diminishes the everyday life activities" of confined individuals.' 0"
The Court was careful to point out that the ADA in no way condones termination
of institutionalization for individuals who require an inpatient level of care,'0 5 nor
does it require that community-based treatment be imposed on patients involuntarily. 10" The majority denied requiring states to meet a particular "standard of care"
but held that "States must adhere to the ADA's nondiscrimination requirement with
regard to the services they in fact provide."'"
The last portion of Justice Ginsburg's opinion (HIB), in which she was joined
only by Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, does not represent a majority of the
Court. 8 This portion of the opinion, in construing the reasonable modifications
regulation and the fundamental alteration defense, indicates that the State's
responsibility "is not boundless."'0 9 The Eleventh Circuit construed the reasonable
modifications regulation to allow for a cost-based defense only in very limited
circumstances. 0 Upon remand to the district court, the Eleventh Circuit instructed
that the additional expenses of treating plaintiffs in a community setting should be
looked at vis-a-vis the demands of the State's mental health budget."' Justice
Ginsburg's plurality opinion stated that the court of appeals' construction would

99. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185-86 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S. 624 (1998), quoting Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-140 (1944)).
100. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185-86.
101. See Brief for Petitioners at 20, 21, Olmstead (No. 98-536); Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2176.
102. Id. at 2186.
103. Id. at 2187 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984); Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)) (referring only fleetingly in the majority opinion to the analogy, drawn by
Respondents, between the stigmatizing injury ofinstitutional segregation and that of racial discrimination); see also
Brief for Respondents at 25-30, Olmstead (No. 98-536). But see Reply Brief at 17, Olmstead (No. 98-536) ("In
light of plaintiffs' inflammatory reference to eugenics, racial segregation and other inapt charges, it asks too much
of Georgia not to respond... such unfair genelizations have 'wounding stigmas' of their own...")
104. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2187 (citing Amici Curiae Brief for American Psychiatric Association at

20-22).
105. Compare this with Part Iof Justice Kennedy's concurrence, in which he was joined by Justice Breyer,
Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2191 (expressing concern that the indiscriminate deinstitutionalization of individuals with
mental disabilities could result in some individuals being discharged into settings devoid of necessary services).
106. See id at 2187-88.
107. Id. at 2188 n.14.

108. See id. at 2188-90.
109. See id. at 2188.
110. See L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 902 (11th Cir. 1998).
111. See id. at 905.
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leave the states "virtually defenseless."' 1 2 This portion of the opinion expressed
concern about the unlikelihood that a state would ever prevail if the expenses
entailed in placing an individual plaintiff in a community-based program were to
be measured for reasonableness against the state's entire mental health budget.'
A more sensible construction of the reasonable modifications regulation, reasoned
the plurality, would be to require that the costs of providing community-based care
to a particular plaintiff be compared to the State's mental health budget, given the
responsibility the State has to provide treatment equitably to a large and diverse
population of individuals with mental disabilities." 4 The plurality indicated that the
district court should consider not only the cost of providing community care to
litigants, but must also consider the range of services the State provides to others
with mental disabilities while taking into account the State's obligation to provide
services to this population in an evenhanded manner."'
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the plurality, went on to emphasize that institutional
placement may be necessary in some instances and that such placement needs to
remain available. 6 Many individuals with mental disabilities may require different
levels of care at different times." 7 According to the plurality, a state must have
more "leeway" than the court of appeals would allow in order to maintain an
appropriate range of facilities and in order to administer services "with an even
hand."".. This portion of the opinion stated that it is not unreasonable for a patient
9
to be temporarily detained until a community bed becomes available." To comply
with the reasonable modifications standard, a state would need to demonstrate that
it had an effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with disabilities in
less restrictive settings and that it had a "waiting list that moved at a reasonable
not controlled by the state's endeavors to keep its institutions fully
pace
populated.""lz
ConcurringOpinions
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's holding that unjustified institutional
isolation constitutes discrimination under the ADA.' He parted with the majority,
however, in his belief that the court of appeals had appropriately remanded for
consideration of the State's affirmative defense. 2 ' The district court, he wrote, was
wrong in concluding that costs unrelated to plaintiffs' treatment should not be
considered."z He believed that this error should be corrected either by the court of
C.

112. Olnutead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188.
113. See id.
114. Seeid at2189.
115. See id

116.
117.
118.
119.

See id
See id
Seeid
See id.

(citing Amicus Curiae Brief of the Voice of the Retarded et al. at II).
at 2189 (citing Reply Brief at 19).
at2189.
at 2189-90.

120. Id. at 2189.

121. See id. at 2190.
122. See id.
123. See id.
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appeals or by the Supreme Court in review of that decision.' 24 Lacking, however,
a sufficient majority in favor of affirming the court of appeals judgment, Justice
Stevens joined the majority in the judgment and on the larger part of their
opinion.' 25
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment of the Court, but wrote a separate
1 27
opinion. 26 Justice Breyerjoined the first part of Justice Kennedy's concurrence.
Justice Kennedy expressed concern that the ADA could potentially be misinterpreted by states, resulting in the inappropriate deinstitutionalization of individuals
with mental disabilities who legitimately require an institutional setting. 28 "[If the
principle of liability announced by the Court is not applied with caution and
circumspection, States may be pressured into attempting compliance on the cheap,
placing marginal patients into integrated settings devoid of the services and
attention necessary for their condition. ' 129 He cautioned that the recommendations
of treating physicians be given the greatest deference to avoid the discharge of30
patients who could not be adequately served by a community-based environment.'
Justice Kennedy, in the second part of his concurrence, stated that he would
remand the case to determine whether Plaintiffs could demonstrate discrimination,
in violation of Title II of the ADA, by showing that they received different
treatment than members of a comparison group based on their disability.1 3 1 Justice
Kennedy suggested that Plaintiffs might be able to demonstrate discrimination by
contrasting the treatment they received while trying to obtain services to that of
non-disabled patients. 32 Non-disabled individuals are not subjected to unwarranted
segregation in their pursuit of medical services. ' Discrimination, Justice Kennedy
wrote, "tends to be an expansive concept and, as legal category, it must be applied
with care and prudence.' ' 3' Because he did not believe that discrimination by
disability was adequately shown, Justice Kennedy asserted that the judgment of the
courts below, granting partial summary judgment to plaintiffs, ought not be
sustained. 3 5
Justice Kennedy, unlike the dissenters, did find it instructive that Congress
identified the isolation and segregation of persons with disabilities as a form of
discrimination in the opening provisions of the ADA and listed institutionalization
as a critical area where discrimination persists. 3 6 Unlike the majority, however, he
interpreted these findings as representative of a congressional concern about

124. See id.
125. See id. at 2181-88, 2190.
126. See id. at 2190-94.
127. See id at 2190-92.
128. See id. at 2191; see also Brief for Petitioners at 1, Olmstead (No. 98-536) (characterizing Respondents'
argument as a "one-size-fits-all solution" and as a matter of "institutionalization vs. deinstitutionalization of mental
health care").
129. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2192.

130. See id
131. See id
132. See id. at 2192- 93.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 2193.
135. See id at 2194.

136. See id at 2193.
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discrimination in some institutional settings; he did not see the ADA as suggesting
a departure from the more traditional definition of discrimination as "differential
treatment of similarly situated groups." 3 '
Justice Kennedy also expressed concern about interpreting the ADA in such a
manner as to interfere with state decisions regarding the allocation of limited
resources, and indicated that such an interpretation could result in "federalism
costs" by compromising the balance of power between states and the federal
government. 138 He stated that these are political issues and should not be governed
' Justice Kennedy wrote that "grave constitutional concerns" are
by federal statute. 39
courts are given the authority to review state decisions about
federal
when
raised
the administration of state mental health programming.1", The Attorney General's
reasonable modifications regulation"" would not, according to Justice Kennedy,
require a state to create new community programs where none exist. 4 2
Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality opinion",3 that states are entitled to
wide discretion in their allocation of resources and the administration of their
mental health programs." According to Justice Kennedy, "we must be cautious
when we seek to infer specific rules limiting states' choices when Congress has
used only general language in the controlling statute."' 4 s
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, disagreed
strongly with the majority's interpretation of discrimination. '" Until this decision,
the dissent argued, discrimination had been understood as "differential treatment
vis-A-vis members of a different group on the basis of a statutorily described
characteristic.""' The dissent pointed out that the Court had, in the past, utilized
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to determine standards of discrimination, which
required a comparison class when interpreting statutes concerning other forms of
discrimination.'" In past decisions interpreting section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, the Court found that only "evenhanded treatment of handicapped persons
relative to those without disabilities" was required." 9 Because the case at hand
D.

137. Id.
138.

See id.

139. See id.
140. See id.

141. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (7) (1999).
142. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2193.
143. See id at 2189 (asserting that states must have "more leeway than the courts below understood the
fundamental alteration defense to allow").
at 2194.
144. See id.
145.

Id.

at 2194-95.
146. See id.
147.

Id. at 2194.

148. See id. at 2195. In the past the Court has recognized two forms of discrimination under Title VII:

disparate treatment and disparate impact, but both have required a comparison class. The Court has used this
standard of discrimination in its construction of other anti-discrimination legislation, such as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. See id.
149. Id. at 2196 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,410 (1979); Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 302 (1985)); see Amicus Curiae Brief of the States in Support of Petitioners at 13-14,
Olmstead (No. 98-536) (arguing that the Rehabilitation Act had not been interpreted, by the courts, as requiring
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concerns disparate treatment among members of the same protected class, the

dissent did not believe discrimination could be shown."5 They argued that
"temporary exclusion from community placement" does not constitute discrimination.' Because Title U of the ADA forbids discrimination "by reason of such
disability,"' 5 2 the dissent argued that the statute "should be read as requiring
proximate causation as well."' 5 3 The majority of the Court, wrote the dissent, had
based its interpretation on "general, hortatory" language or mere "aspirational

terms" contained in the ADA.' 5I The dissent also stated that "a departure from the

traditional understanding of discrimination requires congressional action."' 55 If

Congress had intended to redefine discrimination in Title II,the dissent argued, they

would have included a special meaning by definition.' 56
The dissent criticized the majority for importing Title I's definition of discrimination into Title H.'57 Although Congress did alter the traditional meaning of
discrimination in Title I of the ADA, in describing isolation and segregation as
forms of discrimination,' they did not explicitly do so with regard to Title UI."9

The Court, argued the dissent, should respect the limited applicability of this altered
definition and not apply it to other parts of the statute.1 °

Justice Thomas also maintained that, because the ADA plainly expressed the
intent of Congress, the Court need not have relied on the Attorney General's
integration regulation.1 6' According to the dissent, the Attorney General's

regulations contradict the settled meaning of discrimination and cannot prevail
against it."'

The dissent criticized the majority opinion for "imposing a standard of care."' 63

They implied that, given the majority's broadening of the concept, discrimination

will be found merely because an individual "does not receive the treatment he
wishes to receive."'6

that persons with disabilities be placed in the least restrictive setting appropriate). This brief, in support of

Petitioners, was filed by a group of 13 states, but several of the states later wrote to the Court asking to withdraw
from this brief. See supra note 39.
150. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2194; see also Brief for Petitioners at 12-13, Olmstead (No. 98-536)

(arguing the need for a comparison class to make a finding of discrimination); Amicus Curiae Brief of the States
in Support of Petitioners at 10-14, Olmstead (No. 98-536).
151. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2194.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
153. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at2199.
154. See id. at 2197 (referring to the quoted statements of congressional findings as "a rather thin reed upon
which to base a requirement").
155. let at 2195 (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59,69-70 (1995)).
156. See id. at 2197; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of the States in Support of Petitioners at 14, Olmstead
(No. 98-536).
157. See Olmstead, 119S. Ct. at 2197-98.
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2) (1994).
159. See id. § 12131; Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2197-98.
160. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2197-98 (citing Russello v. United States 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
161. See id. at 2197 n.4, n.5 (asserting that deference to a regulation is only appropriate where there is
ambiguity, and then only if the administrative interpretation is reasonable); see also Reply Brief at 7-8, Olmstead
(No. 98-536) (arguing that ADA is not ambiguous and, accordingly, administrative regulations should not be
looked to in construing the ADA).
162. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2197 n.5; see also Brief for Petitioners at 39-42, Olmstead (No. 98-536).
163. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2198.
164. Id. (arguing that the Majority's approach is a departure from the "traditional understanding of
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The dissent also expressed significant concern about "federalism costs" incurred
in directing states about public service delivery decisions, as the majority's holding
does appear to give the federal court system more power to influence state decisions
concerning the administration of mental health programming. 5 The dissent argued
that "the appropriate course would be to respect the States' historical role as the
dominant authority responsible for providing services to individuals with
disabilities." 1" The majority's construction of the fundamental alteration defense,
asserted the dissent, will "likely come as cold comfort to the States that will now
be forced to defend themselves in federal court every time resources prevent the
immediate placement of a qualified individual."' 67
V. ANALYSIS
Although the Olmstead holding appears hopeful, seeming to promise individuals
with mental disabilities less isolation and the chance for greater participation in the
benefits of mainstream society, remaining ambiguities could dilute the positive
effects of the holding. Because the Court remained divided on a number of
important issues such as the nature of discrimination and questions concerning
federalism,' the Olmsteaddecision provides little guidance regarding a number of
important questions.
Unanswered Questions
A majority of the Court agreed that the unnecessary institutionalization of
individuals with mental disabilities may constitute discrimination under the ADA."9
However, the Olmsteadmajority failed to move beyond basic statutory construction.
The Court did not clarify what would constitute "reasonable accommodation" by
a state or other public entity, how much deference the Attorney General's
regulations should be given, nor did it indicate how it might respond in the future
to questions regarding the constitutionality of the ADA.
The portion of Justice Ginsburg's opinion that approaches the issue of what a
state must do in order to comply with the ADA did not garner majority support. "o
Justice Ginsburg' wrote that a state would meet its obligation under the ADA if
it could "demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, effectively working plan for
placing qualified persons ... in less restrictive settings" and a waiting list that
"moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its

A.

discrimination," which concerns "a prohibition against certain conduct").
165. See id. (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992)); see also Brief for Petitioners at 31-32, Olmstead (No. 98-536) (arguing that the ADA "does not provide
the clear statement necessary" for Congress to seize such "wide-ranging control" over a "core area of state and local
government").
166. Olmstead, 119 S.Ct. at 2199 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 307 (1985)).
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 2181 (noting that unnecessary institutionalization results when an individual is deemed
medically appropriate for, and does not oppose transfer to, a less restrictive setting).
170. Seeid. at 2188-90.
171. Joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer.
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institutions fully populated."' There was no indication, however, of what might
constitute a "reasonable" wait for a community bed or how it could be ascertained
whether the waiting list was affected by other institutional concerns such as bed
utilization and the fiscal impact of a low census. 7 3 The Court indicated that a state's
treatment professionals should determine when community placement may be
appropriate. 7 4 The Court did not discuss the possibility that state clinicians may be
pressured into making treatment recommendations in acquiescence with their
employers' administrative and budgetary concerns.'
The majority opinion was explicit in stating that the ADA does not impose a

standard of care, but did hold that states must adhere to the ADA's nondiscrimination requirement "with regard to the services they in fact provide."176 The Court,

however, did not indicate what would happen if a state did not provide, or should
cease the operation of, programs offering services for individuals with mental
disabilities.7 7
The majority read the ADA in conjunction with the Attorney General's
"integration" and "reasonable modifications" regulations 78 and indicated that the
Attorney General's views warrant respect. ' The Court apparently rejected
Respondents' contention that the "integration regulation" had been "incorporated

by reference" into the statute when Congress in the ADA instructed the Attorney
General to issue implementation regulations modeled on the section 504 regulations.' 80 The Court did not, however, specify how much deference these regulations
should be given, although the majority's reliance on the Attorney General's
regulations does indicate that these regulations are to be looked to in trying to
determine how much a state may have to modify its existing programs to comply
with the ADA's anti-discrimination provision.'
82
The Court did not grant certiorari on the issue of the ADA's constitutionality,
which was raised by petitioners and their amici,8 3 nor did it address the constitu-

172. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2189; see Brief for Respondents at 9, 47, Olmstead (No. 98-536) (arguing that
the reluctance of state officials to downsize large institutions may be due to concern that such decisions would
result in a loss of approval from constituents whose jobs may be impacted, and heavy union lobbying).
173. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2189.
174. See idat 2181. See generally Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,321-323 (1982) (emphasizing that
the courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by qualified professionals in order to minimize
interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operations of state institutions, and stating that the opinions
of qualified professionals are "presumptively valid").
175. See Note, Leading Cases III: FederalStatutes,Regulations,And Treaties, 113 HARv. L. REv. 326, 332334 (1999) (criticizing the OlmsteadCourt for its deference to state treatment professionals who may be influenced
by the concerns of their employers).
176. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188 n.14.
at 2189; see also Rodriguez v.City of New York, 197 F.3d 611,618-19 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing
177. See id.
Olmstead as addressing only services that are already in place, but not requiring states to implement additional
programs which would assist individuals with disabilities with the opportunity to remain in the community).
178. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1999); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (7) (1999).
179. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2186.
180. See Brief for Respondents at 18, Olmstead (No. 98-536) (citing U.S. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Sheffield,
435 U.S. 110, 134 (1978)).
181. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2186.
182. See Olmstead v. L.C., 525 U.S. 1054 (1998), cert. granted,amended by, 525 U.S. 1062 (1998).
183. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the States of Florida, et al. in Support of Petitioners for aWrit of Certiorari
at 17-20, Olmstead (No. 98-536) (arguing that the ADA, as construed by the Eleventh Circuit, violates the Tenth
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tional issues plaintiff-respondents had initially raised in their complaint.' 84 Because
the Olmstead Court did not address these constitutional questions, it is 85not clear
how the Court would respond if these issues were to arise in the future.
B.

The FundamentalAlteration Defense: An Exception that Stands to Swallow
the Rule?
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the plurality, 6 stated that it would be too difficult
for states to comply with the Eleventh Circuit's construction of the "fundamental
alteration" defense and that a state requires considerable "leeway" in maintaining
a range of facilities.'8 7 The Attorney General's regulations indicate that a
"reasonable accommodation" should not impose an "undue hardship" on the
operation of a program. 8' The plurality indicated that an "undue hardship" inquiry
should consider such factors as the size and type of a program, the entity's budget,
and the cost and nature of the requested accommodation. 9 Because this portion of
Justice Ginsburg's opinion did not represent a majority of the Court, and because
these factors are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis," 9 considerable ambiguity
exists. The Olmstead ruling could be interpreted as giving the states enough
"leeway" to excuse, as financially prohibitive,' 9' practically any request for
accommodation by an individual with disabilities. Holding that unjustified
institutionalization is a form of discrimination, while excusing the provision of less
and Eleventh Amendments of the Constitution, and exceeds Congress' § 5 authority to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (holding that Congress may
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court only through a valid exercise of its
§ 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,534-37 (1997) (holding
that Congress may act under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect discrete groups only when the Court itself
has identified that group as deserving of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection). See generally James Leonard,
A Damaged Remedy: Disability Discrimination Claims Against State Entities Under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct After Seminole Tribe and Flores, 41 ARiz. L REv. 651 (1999) (discussing the controversy, since
Seminole and Flores,over Congress' power to subject states to a federal forum for ADA disability discrimination
claims).
184. Although Plaintiffs' complaint had initially raised a Fourteenth Amendment cause of action, the Court
declined to address this because the lower courts had resolved the case solely on statutory grounds. See Olmstead,
119 S. Ct. at 2181.
185. But cf Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1007-10 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted in part,
Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 120 S.Ct. 1003 (2000), dismissed,No. 99-423, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 1736 (March 1, 2000)
(holding that extension of ADA Title I to the states is not a proper exercise of Congress' power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, disagreeing with decisions in the 11 th, 5th, 9th, and 7th Circuits). Alsbrook, which has
been settled, was to be consolidated with Florida Dept. ofCorrections v. Dickson, 120 S. Ct. 976 (2000). dismissed,
No. 98-829, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 1545 (Feb. 23, 2000) (presenting the question of whether the ADA is a proper
exercise of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). Cf Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120
S. Ct. 631 (2000) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is not a valid exercise of
Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
186. Joined by Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Souter. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188-90.
187. See id.
188. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.53, 42.511 (c) (1999).
189. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2190 (referring to 28 C.F.R. § 42.511 (c) (1999)).
190. See id.

191. Although numerous studies indicate that community care can be more cost-effective than
institutionalization and federal funding is available to help defray costs, Petitioners expressed concern regarding
the potential expenses involved in providing community-based care. See Amicus Curiae Brief of 58 Former State
Commissioners et al. in Support of Respondents at 8-17, Olmstead(No. 98-536); Reply Brief at 11, Olmstead(No.
98-536); see also Brief for Respondents at 47-48, Olmstead(No. 98-536) (alleging that costs are a pretext voiced
by states seeking to delay ADA compliance, because of other political and administrative concerns).
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restrictive care when it is deemed too costly or difficult, could be construed as
tacitly giving the states permission to discriminate against individuals with mental
disabilities when it is too inconvenient to do otherwise.
The failure of the Court to provide any practical guidelines may reflect an
inability to reach a consensus, or it may indicate the exercise of judicial restraint.
All that is certain is that these questions, concerning the scope of a state's duty to
provide minimally restrictive care, will remain unanswered until clarification is
provided by further litigation or by further legislative efforts.
A More Comprehensive Definition of Discriminationand a GreaterRecognition of the Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities
Despite the many questions the Court leaves unanswered, the Olmstead
majority's construction of discrimination, under the ADA, appears to be a positive
step towards recognizing the rights of individuals with mental disabilities. 192 The
dissent argued that discrimination "requires a showing that a claimant received
differential treatment vis-A-vis members of a different group on the basis of a
statutorily described characteristic."' 93 Because individuals with mental disabilities
often require services not needed by those without such a disability, petitioners'
argument that states must only demonstrate "evenhanded treatment between the
handicapped and non-handicapped,"'" apparently adopted by the dissent, would
make it virtually impossible to address the rights of people with mental disabilities
under the ADA. The majority, however, held that it was "satisfied that Congress
had a more comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination advanced in the
ADA." 95 The Court, in holding that unnecessary institutionalization is a form of
discrimination, appears to have rejected petitioners' argument that a voluntarily
admitted patient is not, by definition, "confined" in an institution. 9 Despite the
Court's failure to define, in a meaningful way, the duty of the states to provide
alternative placements," 9' the Olmstead Court's construction of discrimination'9
could help bolster the rights of individuals with mental disabilities to more
integrated care and a greater degree of community participation.
Although individuals with mental disabilities may vary as to the degree of
services they may require at a given time, an unduly restrictive institutional setting
can have detrimental effects and may result in regression or the development of
maladaptive behaviors.' 99 Not only does community care have considerable
C.

192. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2186.
at 2194.
193. id.
194. Brief for Petitioners at 12, 22, Olmstead (No. 98-536).
195. Olmstead, 119 S.CL at 2186.
196. See Brief for Petitioners at 36, Olmstead (No. 98-536); Reply Brief at 1-3, Olmstead (No. 98-536)
(emphasizing the distinction between patients admitted voluntarily and those admitted involuntarily, apparently
without regard to the fact that such a distinction is meaningless when a voluntarily admitted patient, who requires

care, has no other viable options).
197. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. 2176.
198. See id. at 2187.
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therapeutic benefits, but numerous studies also indicate that it can be more costeffective than institutionalization.'
Ultimately, the ambivalence of the Court may reflect a more general societal
ambivalence toward individuals with mental disabilities. Society itself may be
deeply divided about whether individuals with disabilities should be integrated into
its midst, 20 ' who should be responsible for providing and financing their care, and
how the needs of individuals with mental disabilities are to be prioritized in the
allocation of scarce state resources.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The Olmsteaddecision should help promote the ongoing trend of providing care
to an increasing number of individuals with mental disabilities in less restrictive,
community settings.m The states, in recent years, have begun to recognize that
community care can be therapeutically beneficial, as well as cost-effective.' °3 The
Court's decision should encourage states in their efforts to plan for the development
of mental health programs that provide a full range of services that can accommodate individuals with mental disabilities who can benefit from community-based
programs, as well as those individuals who may periodically require a more
structured setting.
The lack of clear guidance provided by the Olmstead Court, in regard to the
states' responsibility to provide minimally restrictive care, will likely result in
further litigation around these issues. Numerous ambiguities in the Olmstead
decision may make it relatively easy for states to use a "fundamental alteration" or
"undue hardship" defense' to protest practically any request for accommodation.
Individuals with mental disabilities who are being subjected to unjustified
institutionalization may have to resort to litigation to argue their right to treatment
that is not unduly restrictive.
Although the Court'sjudgment, holding that unjustified institutionalization is a
form of discrimination, °5 may help bolster the right of individuals with mental
disabilities, the Court's failure to provide any practical guidelines or any meaningful limitation on the defense available to the states will likely dilute the Olmstead
decision's positive impact on the rights of individuals with mental disabilities.

200. See Amicus Curiae Brief of 58 Former State Commissioners in Support of Respondents at 12-19,
Olmstead (No. 98-536).
201. See Brief for Respondents at 1, Olmstead (No. 98-536).
202. See generally TH1E STAI OF THE STAiS INDEVELOPMENTAL DISABRIMES, supra note 42, at 9-13
(discussing the expansion of community care services by states).
203. See Amicus Curiae Brief of 58 Former State Commissioners in Support of Respondents at 3-6
OLmstead (No. 98-536); see also Amicus Curiae Brief of the States in Support of Petitioners, Appendix A,
Olmstead (No. 98-536) (New Mexico currently provides care to individuals with developmental disabilities in
intermediate care facilities or community-based programs, rather than in institutions; this information applies only
to those individuals with developmental disabilities, not those with mental illness or other types of disabilities).
See generallyTHE STATE OF THE STATES IN DEVELOPMENTAL DIsABu~rrES, supra note 42, at 12-13 (discussing
the benefits of supported community living).
204. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188-90.
205.

See id 119S. Ct. at2181.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The apparent ambivalence of the Olmstead Court can be seen as a reflection of
more general societal attitudes. Society itself may be deeply ambivalent about the
integration of individuals with mental disabilities into community-based programs,
the financial impact of providing this care, and the role of the federal government
in protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities. Although the Court's
construction of the ADA does appear to speak to a greater recognition of the rights
of individuals with mental disabilities, the Olmstead decision fails to offer the
guidance necessary to fully ensure these rights and appears to create as many
questions as it answers.
ROSEMARY L. BAUMAN

